If profit mtimiting tis have firnited information about the general productivhy of new workers, they may choose to use easfly observable characteristics such 'asyears of education to "statisticdy discriminate" among workers. The pure credentid value of education W depend on how quicMy firms learn. To obtain Mormation on employer Ie-g, we work with a wage equation that contains both the interaction between experience and a hard to observe variable that is positively related to productivity and the interaction between experience and a variable that tis can easfiy observe, such as years of education. The time path of the coefficient on the unobservable productivity variable provides information about tbe rate at which employers l= about worker productivity, Using data from the NLSY we obtain pre~tiary estimates of the rate at which employers learn about worker qudhy and use these, along with some strong au~ary assumptions, to explore the empirical relevance of the education screening hypothesis. We show that even if employers learn relatively slowly about the productivity of new workers, the portion of the return to education that could reflect signrding of abfity is~ited.
Introduction

M tis
have~ited tirmation about productivity or the personal attributes that determine productivity (such as knowledge, aptitude, and motivation), they til have an incentive to "statistically discritiate" among young workers on the basis of easfiy observable variables that are correlated with productivity, such as education.* By the same tokeu the sigrrrding value of education is~ikely to be an important part of the return to education ody to the extent that tis lack good inforsnation.about the productivity of new workers and learn slowly overtime. k this paper, we provide some pretinrinq evidence on how much tis know about new workers and how quic~y they learn over time and then use this tiormation to address the issue of how much of the return to education could be "due to signrdirrg rather tb to the direct effeet of edumtion on productivity.
The key difficulty for our investigation of sidg is how to measure how quic~y employers learn. Our analysis uses an approach developed more My in Mtonji and Plerret (1995, hertier W) . It is based on a model in which firms have ordy titd information about the qudty of workers in the early stages of their careers. They statisticdy dlscrimirrate among workers on the basis of easfiy observable variables that are corrdated with productivi~such as years of education or degree, the qurdi~of the school the person attende~race, and gender. They weigh this information with other information about outside activities, work expdence to date, and the information contained in references, the job interview, and perhaps foti testing by the fi.
Each period, the firm observes noisy indicators of the worker's performance. Over time, these 1 We use the term "statisdd discrimination" to mean that in the absence of W irrformatiof irms disdnguish between individrrrds with different characteristics based on statisti~re~tities. That is,~form rational expectations~ven the tiorrnatimr they have. Many papers thti use the term statisticrd discrisnkmdon rmdyze race or gender differentials that arise because ti have trouble processing the information @ey receive about the pefiormance of minority "~oup members. Seẽ gner and Cti (1977), Lundberg and S-(1983) , Lang (198~, arrd Coate and Loury (1993) and Oetiger(1996j. make the information observed at the stti redundant. Wages become more closely tied to actual produdivity and less strongly dependent upon the information that was r~dily atiable at the beginning of a worker's career... We dmwifieren%s about how quicuy firms learn by observing the rate at which the weight in a wage equation s~s from variables that the h can easfly observe (such as schoo~ig) to a variable tht wodd be hard to observe.
Our investigation of employer learning bufids on some previous work particularly Farber and Gbbons (1994) .2 Farber and @bbons investigate three irnpfications of employer ltig. tigine a variables (say schootig) which firms cm observe dwdy and a second variable, z (saỹ QT test scores) which tis aot observe directly. They show fist that employer learning fiply that the coefficient ons ti a wage regression W change with experience. This is because fiture observations, on average, simply vddate the rektionship between expected productivity ands for new entrants. This point has been made previously as a criticism of attempts to test screcnin~si~ng models of the return to edumtion based on changes in the education coefficient over time. Second, they show that the part of z that is orthogorrrd to information avtiable to employers at the beginning of a workeds careers d have an increasin#y large association tith wages as t~e passes. Third, they note that wage growth@ be a Hngde process, at least in the case in which productivity of the worker is constant.
h this paper and~we make use of a dfierent but related proposition. Specifidy, the proposition conce~" how controfig for the experience protie of the effect of z on wages alters the interaction between experience ands. We show that not ordy should the coefficient on z rise ' Other relevmt referenc& are Oibbons md =tz (1991) which we &cuss below"and Pasons (1993) . Foster and Rosenzweig (1993) use data on piece rate and time-rate workers to investigate several implications of imperfect information on tie pti of employers that are~erent from tie one studied here. Theti resdts tipIy tiat tie ticompleteness of employer informadorr is m tipomt issue. Parsons (198Q, Weiss (1995) ad Carmichael (1989) provide rrsefi discussions of some of the theoretid issues on the li betw&n wages and employer perceptions about productivity. Montgomery (1991) is part of a large literature on labor market networks. Mbrecht (1982) conducts a test of screening models of eduation based on the idea that eduwtion W have less impact on the probabihty a worker will be hired if tie worker was referred to the h by.sarotier worker bemuse some of the information con~ed in education til be trwrnitted through the referral.
with time in the labor market, but the coefficient ons should fd. We dso show that the time path of the coefficients provides information about employer learning h the current paper we present our basic framework and an initial set of empirical results.3 We use our results to assess the signalfirrg model of edumtion.
The paper proceeds as follows. b Section 2 we use two simple examples to show that evidence on how much firms know about workers and how quicMy they learn is hi@y relevant to assessing the potentird importance of si@]ng in the return to education. k Section 3 we present our basic theoreticrd framework and our approach to assessing whether employers learn and the rate at wtich they learn. In Section 4 we discuss the~SY data used in the study. h Section 5 we present estimates of the wage model and provide a prex assessment of the evidence that employers statisticdy discriminate among workers and 1= over time. k. Section 6 we use our estimates of the experience profle of the effect of MQT scores on wages along with some autilhary assumptions about employer learning to provide a range of estimates of what the intemd rate of return to education would be if education has no direct effect on productivity and if a year of education raises the log-of productivity by .05. We show that the "sign~ng component" of the return to education is probably ody a sd pti of the percentage dfierence in wages associated with education. Thus, while we find evidence that information is imperfect and tis do statistically discriminate among young workers on the basis of educatio~our estimates suggest that they learn quicHy enough to~it the return to a costly signal such as education.
In Section 7, we consider a potenti role for other less cosdy si@s of productivity in the labor market. Specifidly, we demonstrate that interpreting our estimates of the time pro~e of the effect of~QT on wages as the result of employer learning imphes that high abtity workers would have a substarrtid fmancid incentive to take the MQT to dflerentiate themselves &om those who are less able in this dimension. The fact that we do not obseme ttis raises an issue for 3 Our research on the theoretical and econometric issues surrounding employer I-g and statisficrd diicritition md "ourempirical analysis using National Longitudind Survey OfYouth SY)
is ongotig and till be presented in Ml detti ti a revised version of N. 
bemuse tier 2 years in the labor market productivity is know regardless of whether the person went to school or not.
The above imphes that a type YI will choose school if
The parameter K must be greater than or equal to 1 for the type YI person to choose school, That is, for school to make sense for a type YI, employers must pay double for someone who they beheve is type Y1. Since a more refllstic estimate of the percent incrwse in earnings associated with a year of school is .08 or. 1, it is CIW that if employers can observe productivity within a couple of years and the information is efficiently pubfic to force tis to adjust wages in response, then the si-g value of education cannot be the main reason why education is valued in the market A second eKarnple may help estrrhfish the inverse relationship between the rate at which employers learn about the skill of workers and the potential importmce of si~fllng in the return to education. Let the average productivity of workers with ski~level s' be Y(s'), and assume that education has no direct effect on labor market productivity. Suppose that the ordy information tis have about workers when they enter the labor market is their education levels. Suppose that the relationship between SW s' of a worker and the mst of acquiring education and between s and wages is such that in equ~lbrium a worker with sM1 levels' choosess years of schoohg. k this case the average productivi~of a worker withs years of education is Y, = Y(s'). Let the parameter (I+K) be equal to Y&~I , wtich is dso equal to Y(s')H(s'-I). Rrrns acquire information about the productivity of workers by observing their performance in the labor market.
Suppose that in the absence of information on schoofin~their estimate of the productivity of a type s' worker who has chosen s-1 years of schoofing rather than the usual value of S=S'for this type is We would We to be able to. solve for p given empirical information about the rate at which information about skiHs is reflected in wages. In the ne~sectioq we examine the irnpfications of employer learning for wage e~utions, and in section 5 we provide estimates of the parameters of the rate at which employers learn. These estimates enable us to estimate the time path of employer Iefig up to sale. In Section 6 we will use these estimates with some atiary assumptions to petiorm some calculations of what the inted rate of return to schoo~mg would be if school has no direct effect on productivity. In this setiiorr we outhe a model of employer learning and wages. We use the model to show how coefficients in a wage equation on characteristics that employers can observe directly and on characteristics they cannot observe directly~change as employers become better informed about worker produtiivity.4
The basic setup of the model is s~ar to Farber and Gibbons (1994) . Let yi be the log of labor market productivi~of worker i with ti years of experience. yi is determbred by
where Si is yews of schoohg, q is a correlate of produaivi~that is not observed directiy by employers but is avtiable to the econometrician, and H(ti) is the experience pro~e of productivity. The variable qi consists of other determinants of productivity and is not direcfly observed by the employers or the econometrician. The variable q might be a test score, the income of arr older sibhg, or father's education. To simp~the notation but without loss of generality we scale z and qi so that they have unit coefficients in the productivity equation. In addition to Si, the employer observes a variety of other tigs about the worker that are relevant to productivity, which we denote by the vector~. For now we assume that the experience protie of productivity does not depend on q,~, qi, or qi, but we wi~briefly consider the consequences of relaxing ttisassumption below. k most of the analysis we suppress the i subscript. Ml variables are expressed as deviations from population means. In this paper we use years of schoo~mg as our example ofs, but the basic argument apphes to any variable that employers can easily observe.
For e~ple, in W we consider race as well.
Firms do not observe yit and so must form an estimate of it. We assume that the condhiond expectation of z Qvens and q, E(z]s,q) and E(q\s,@, are Enear in q ands, so 4 See W for a more complete development of the model. Note that the W between z and q ands maybe partidy due to a causal effect of s.6 The SUM v+e is uncorrected tith q but in addition we assume that v +e is independent of q ands. The sum v + e is the error in the employer's befief about the log productivity of the worker at the time the worker enters the labor market.
Each period that a worker is in the labor market, firms observe a noisy si~of the productivity of the worker, . 5The exclusion of q from the conditiomd mean of q is irmocuous, since we are stiply defirrirrg q ad the coefficient vector a, on q in (1) so that the mem ofq does not depend on q.
s For example, below we use the Wed Forces Qualification Test (~QT as z md yem of education ass, and N4 rmd Johnson (1995) present evidence that y=s of education have a sizeable positive effect on WQT.
We dso assume that q, s, and Di are known to d] employers, as in Farber and Oibbons. & a result of competition among firms, the worker receives a wage Wt equal to the expected value of productivity Yt (Yt = exp(y~) times the mdtipficative error component exp(~~that reflects measurement error and firm spedc factors outside the model. (6) W~=E(YJs,q,Dt)e c' Using (1) (2), and (3)~d (6) Mthough some autiors have purported to test screetig models by testing whether the coefficient ons decbes with experience (e.g., Layard and Psacharopoulos (1 974)), Mey (1979) and others have noted that udess the relationship between schootig and acmd productivity chrmges, the coefficient ons d not ckge. This is true regwdless of~s is related to productivity. Farber and Gbbons make this point by showing in a more general version of the model above that the expected value of the coefficient of an OLS regression of wt ons does not depend on t. They estimate an equation of the form
,10
with q treated as an error component. They fid that b~does not depend mu&on t.7
Farber and @bbons dso make a second point, wtich is that if one adds tie component z' of (v + e) that is uncorrelated with the employefs initial informations and q to the wage equation and estimates (8b) w,= b~s + b~" +~(t) + (al + yl)q + E(v + e\DJ, the aefficient ons does not depend on t. They provide evidence from~SY that b~is relatively constit and bzl is increasing in t, h M we estabbsh and make use of a third resuk, wtich is closely related to the second.
Let the regression equation relating w, to s, z and H(t) be
where we have added the component z to (7) rather than fo~owed Farber md~bbons in adding ody the part of z that is orthogonal to the firm's information set and where (al + y~)q is part of the error term. men the individud starts work (t is O) this equation is
&ume that the sarnp[e has been drawn so thats and t are uncorreiated. Mso assume that z and t are uncorrelated, which is reasomble at least when t is potential qerience ands md t are uncorrelated in the sample.
(12a) b== b,. + e,@s (12b) bz = bzo + 6t@Z
Then it is easy to show (see W) that --7 Farber md Gbbons fofitiate their model h terms of levels of productivity and wsses rather than logs.
where @s and @z are the coefficients of the regression of v+e ons end z and
is a parameter that is specfic to experience level thats ummarizes how much the h bOWS at time t.
To detetie the behavior of Bt@s and Ot@z over time, note first that OS <0 and @z >0 if These results underfie our empiricrd analysis in AP (which also considers gener~itions to vectors ofs and z) and the present paper. We are dso able to estimate the time profile of 6t up to swle. Under the strong assumption that employers learn about v and e at the same rate, this enables us to estimate the time protie of employer Ieting about productivity up to scde.g In section 6 below we ee the implications of our estimates for pure signrdiig models of the return to education. 10
The model rdso impfies a third result, which we state k proposition 3. .
P~: U&r the asmmptiorrsof the above m&l, &3{d = -&zi~Cov(z,s)flm(s).
Siice COV(Z;S)WW(S)
is stiply the regression coefficient of z ons and can be estimated, the coefficient restriction io Proposition 3 may"provide leverage in differentiating~etweeq the learnin~statiiticd discritilon model rmddternative e~l-tirms for the behavior of b~and b=
Modifications to the Modek
Proposition 1, 2,&d 3 are not robust to allowing the effect of z antiors in the productivity equation (1) to depend on t. For e-pie, ifs andor z are complementary with learning by doing or enhance the productivi~of trtig investments, then the productivity g We elaborate on this assumption in Setimr 6. The assumption is natnrd if ti ordy see v+e plus noise, as in the model. However, it seems more rdlstic to assume that firms observe a vector of indicators of productivity. Suppose that the firm observes an indlmtor dlt of v and an indicator dz of e. Suppose fiat v rmd e are independent md the firm knows tis. men if d,, is a less noisy~dicator than da, the ti W lem about v faster than e. This mthat the drne path of 0, will depend upon the choice of z.
10~~tion~t~~~e possible if the econometriciarr @ a set of vtiables B that are observed direcdy by employers, are negatively related to the dir~costs and nonpecrmiary costs of school and are unrelated to productivity. Both human~itrd and screening models imply tit schoolings @ rise with B. h the screening me, ti"~ot &ectly observe y. Consider the e-gs equation Wt= Bn+rs+q h the screening case, rr wiu be negative. The factor B condates the relatiombip betweens ad mrobsewed productivhy y. FIm, by ttig account of factors that affect schookg choices but not productivity, "c"tifofi a better prediction ofy than ifti"~rely onus done. Unfortunately, we have not been able to identi~a set of variables that have the properdes of B, and so we have not pursued this ie of research. There is a large theoretid Eteratie on screerrirr~si~~g models, but the empirical literature is far from conclusive. (See Weiss (1995) for a rrseti discussion of some of the evidence.) h future work it tight be interesting to see if the "diploma effect" deckes with t wtie the coefficients on hard to observe productivity characteristics that correlate with getig a diploma rise. See Frtis (1993) for a recent arrdysis of whether tiere is a diploma effect. equation (net of traiting cosfi) might take the form (13)y, =rs+r1st+r2z t+ H(t)+ (al+y1)q+z+q, rlz O, r2>0.
The interactions between t ands and z in the productivity equation would tiuence the interactions between t and s and z in the wage equatio~although the precise effects depend on the rate at which the h 1-s about z. Consequendy, our estimates of the time path b* will be biased as estimates (up to the scale parameter @z) of the rate at which employers 1-about v + e.
h M we are investigating how this modtication tiects our analysis of the hypothesis that employers learn about productivity over the career. Most discussions of human~itrd and most of the empiricrd evidence on employer provided training suggest that education snakes workers more trainable and that educated workers receive more training. (See, for emple, Mtonji and Spletzer (1992) , Bartel rmd Sicherrnan (1 992), Lynch (1992) and Mncer (1993) ). k~we fid that both highest grade completed (ours variable) and~QT (the z variable in this paper) have strong positive effects in a probit model of whether a worker remives company training during tie year. b tfis case rl till be grwter than O. Below and in M we fid that the edumtion slope of wages has a strong negative relationship with t, wtich is o~y consistent~th a~fig.
interpretation if education reduces lag by doing, the productivi~of training investments, andor the quantity oftraiting investments. The presence of r2 z t in the productivity equation seems urdikely to lead a negative bias in~~dt when~is excluded from the model. 11 If both rl md rz are positive the introduction of~to the wage model that contains~could lead the coefficient on~to fall, but W not lmd it to become negative urdess r, is negative. This seems ufllkely. However, our use of bz in section (5) to draw inferences about the rate at wtich employers learn implicitly assumes that the duect effect of z on sM1 accumulation is O.
1I Fmber~d Gibbons noti that a trtig explanation of their fmtig that~bz*Jdt >0 is~d to reconcfle witi tieir tidtig that~b,~dt is close to Oor negative. The issue of whether information about productiti~'ii'p6bXc";&rpd$at2 ""deieti~i" '"' 7:'"';""; discussion. The equation that relates wages to expected productivi~rests on the assumption that the information available to the employer leaks out to other ernploy%s." However, Ettle"is bofi' about how much of an employer's, a supervisor's, or a co-workers' knowledge of the general productivi~of a Worker becomes tio~to-other prospective employers.' Theoretic~pap;r"s by tieenw~d (198~, Wddman (1984) , L=ear (198@,-tid Gbbons and Kati (1991 ) )"discuss whether information about productivi~will be reflected h promotion paths and wage" incteas~s fit~~, They~so tilSCUSS the strate~cs *S fight' use to t~'to fide'~o~tioi"abbtit good workers. In AP we tivestigate some imphcations of these models for turnover and the relationship between quits, layoffs, and wage gains but our results to date are fti fiom"eoriclusive.
h section 6 W&"brieflyconsider how the possibfity that some of the Mormation obtained by employers is private and not reflected in wages wi~eff~our"anrdysis of sign~g.
Data
The empirid arrdysis is based on the 1992 release of the NSY The~SY is a panel study of men and women who were aged 14-22 in 1978. Sample members were surveyed annually since 1979. We restrict the analysis to men who have completed 8 or more years of education and hve vdld data on d variables used in the analysis.~spanics are =cluded from the ansdysis. We exclude labor market observations prior to the fist t-me that a person lmves school and accumulate experience from that poirrt.=ach panel member contributes at most one obsaation for a ptiitilar year. Khe ii working at two OFmore jobs, we cotiider ordy the wage for the CPS job.
Actual experience is the number of weeks in which the person worked more than 30 hours divided by 50. Potential experience is defined as age minus years of ithoohng mkms 6. The WQT score is noti&ed to have a standard deviation of 1 in the popdatiou but has a sightly larger standard deviation in our sample. 12 The means, standard deviations, -m~d maximums of the variables used in analysis are protided in Table 1 , rdong with the variable definitions. The mean of actual experience is 4.9. The mean of potential experience is 7.3, and tie mean of education is 12.7. ml statistics in the paper are unweighed. Blacks are oversarnpled in the~SY and contribute 29.1 percent of our obsewations. Table 24 we report estimates of various specifications of the wage model. In table 2 we use potential experience as the experience measure and use OLS to esdmate the model. The equations dso control for a cubic in experience, a quadratic time trend, and residence in an urban arm. These variables are not reported in the tables,
Estimatea of the Wage Equation k
In column 3 we present an equation that includess, Black and s*t. This corresponds to (7a) with b< restricted to b== b~+ b,l*t. The coefficient on s*t is -.00075 (.00040), suggesting tht the effect of education on wages deches sfightly with experience. k column 4 we add QT.
As has been we~documented, MQT has a powefil association with earnings even after controlhng for education. As~in AFQT from 1 standard deviation below the mean to I standard deviation above is associatd with an increase in the log wage of. 164, The inefficient .on education decfines to ,0808, but note that b,l fds ody shghtly, to -.00102.
In column 5 we add hear interactions between t and our z variable, MQT. The resulting equation corresponds to (9) with the restriction that b~= bw + b~l*t and ba = ba + b=,*t. The estimates imply that the effect of~QT on the wage increases gready with experience t. bMQ~l, which is the coefficient on AFQT*t, is .0090 (.0008). bM~Tti which is dtiJMQT, rises from 12 me we of he SapIe members a the time the AFQT was administered varies somewhatt he NLSY sample. This hduces some variation in schooltig levels at the time the AFQT is taken. The stidardimtion procedure uses the entire NLSY sample weighted so as to be nationally representative, Follotig Ned Wd Johnson (1995) , each bti cohort year is standardized to a mean of Oand a s@dard deviation of 1. (The lowest stmdard deviation is for the 1963 cohort (35.54) and the highest is for the 1960 cohort (3682), so standard deviation adjustment makes little difference.) The fact that the merm of this va.able is not Oin our sample is due to the over sample of d~advmtaged youths.
cndy .0164 when experience is Oto .1067 when experience is 10. The results imply that wheñ enence is 10 and education is held constant, persons with a value of~QT that is 1 standard detiation above the mean have a log wage that is .211 larger than persons 1 standard deviation bdow the mew while the dflerence is ordy .033 when expedience is O.
Our results for~QT psrdel Farber and Gbbon's resdts in which they use the components of &QT and an indicator for whether the Hy had a hbrary card when the person is 14 that are orthogonal to the wage on the fist job md education. The key new result is that the coefficient on s*t decbes sharply (to -.00348 (.00046)) when MQT*t is added. The knpfied effect of an extra year of education for a person with 10 years of experience is ody .0586.
Strikin@y, the coefficient ons rises to .0987 which is ahnost exdy what we obtin when we exclude W terms involving~QT from the model (columns 1 and 3).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that employers have tited itiornmtion about the productivity of labor force entrants. Early wages are based on expected productitic onditional on easily obsewable variables such as education. & experience accumulates, wages become more strongly related to vtiables that are &ely to be correlated with productivity but hwd for the employer to obseme directiy. We one might argue W the positive coefficient on NQT*t is due to an association between~QT and trfig intensity, it is hard to recorrcfie this view with the negative coefficient on s*t. me measurement error in schoobg may partidy explain the dec~me ins between columns 1 and 2, it does not provide a simple explanation for the behavior of the interaction terms with experience in columns 3 and 4.
b Table 3 we present OLS results using actual experience ti place ofpotenti~experience as the experience measure t, The main dflerence betwmn this table and table 2 is that the return to education is lower and the s*t interaction is positive and faidy Imge in the quations that exclude NQT*t. However, the coefficient on s*t decfines from .0021 in cohnnn 5 to -.0004 when the interaction terms are added in column 6 of Table 3 . Tkis dec~ie is stiar to the decbe that we obtain in Table 2 .
The results in Table 3 are d-~cult to interpret, because the intensity of work experience may be conveying information to employers about worker quality. It is an outcome mwsure itself
Conditioning on a~al work experience raises some of the issues that would arise if we conditioned on wages in t-1. On the other hand, the results based on potential experience are~iely to be biased by the fact that potential experience nrismeasures actual. For this rason, in Table 4 we report the results of re-estirnating the models by instrument variables (~, treating d terms involving actual experience as endogenous tith corresponding terms involving potentird experience as the instrumenfi. The results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 are basicrdly consistent with those in Table 2 . The coefficient on~QT is .0155 (.0062) and the coefficient on WQT*t is .0126 (.001 1). These estimates imply that condition on years of schootig,~QT has ordy a small effect on inhird wages, but when t is 10, a shift in NQT from 1 stidard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean rtises the log wage by .284. The coefficient on s*t declines from -.0018 when the interactions are excluded in column 4 to -.0055 in column 5.
It is interesting to ask whether the experience profles of the education and~QT coefficients satis~the restrictions in Proposition 3. Conaidw the spwification with the tinesr interactions in column 5 of Table 2 . Proposition 3 says that product of the value of -cov(s,z)/var(s) and the coefficient on the interaction between t and~QT, which is equal to -.00253, shodd be close to the coefficient -.00348 on the interaction betweens and t, The estimates differ but are in same neighborhood. The corresponding estimates for (.01 54) when t is 1 to .0135 when t is 3, increases sfigbtly to .0154 when t is 5.5 and then decfines to .0065 when t is 8.5 and to .0037 when t is 12. These results are reasonably mnsistent with a dechne in the amount of new intorrnation with experience fier the fist few years in the labor market.14 Column 5 reports results when flz,t;b> and h(s,~b$) are both fourth order polynotids in t, with coefficierrb so that J2w~~~QT Jt = O and~zw~~s at = O when t is 25. This is"the specifimtiori that underfies our dculations of the intemd rate of return to education k the nefi section. The restrictions captures that idea that firms learn whatever they are going to 1-about the information about productivity that is contained in~QT by the time t is 25. It is important to point out that the 99th percentile value for potential e~enence is 16 and the 95th percentile value is 14, so there is little information in the sample beyond t= 15 or so. The results based on the restricted quartic polynomial are sitiar to those based on the spke finctions. The effect of QT increases monotonically,.. The rate of increase rises at fist but then decfines between P8. 5 and t= 12, k column 7 we report results for unrestricted quartic polynomials. These estimates are very similar to those for the restricted polynofisds but the standard errors are bigger. 15
The kte at which Employers Learn and the Signafing Value of Education
We are now ready to etine the irnphcations of employer learning for the quantitative si~cance of signdlng models of the remm to education. The intemd rate of return p to an additional yar of schoohng is imphcitly defied as the solution to the equation 14~~ol-3 we es~ate a model tifi a spline for the educatiotiexperience~~raction h(s,~b,c). The resdts in rows a and n-r show an increase in~w~~s in the isritid years fo~owed by a decline. Gven the stidard errors we wordd not want to tie too much of tie titid increase. For the same spectilcation the effect of~QT declmw slightly dtig the first 2 years k the labor market before incre%fig. The nntid decline is not consistent with the pattern implied by theory. However, .-. ..-given the standad errors on~QT terms we are not sure how much to mke of this.
15~Table 6 we replwe potential experience with~ti experience, ad~e~acmẽ xperience as endogenous. The 99th percentie value for this variable is ordy 13.33, so there not much smnple information "ont beyond this point. Focussing on the model whh unrestricted quardc specifications for boti f( ) and h( ) (column 7) we fid tiat the effect of~QT increases monotoficrdly whh experience. The rate "ofticrease rises at first from. 01042 when t = 1 to .0144 when @5.5, but deckes to .0059 when t = 12. However, the standard errors on these derivatives are""qnitelarge. These resdts are loosely consistent tith the proposition that tie rate at which new information about tih-d productivity arrives declkes with experience, but the estimates are not sticiendy precise to say much about tis. & the NLSY sample ages, it till be interesting to revisit tie issue. The return to education decbes slighdy in the first year or two but more rapidly &er that. (15) r 'p'W,-le O = P*, *l,..., VT,r, KW.-l, g = JOe "K$<dt-j Te"P'W3_1e''Kd* 1 h the above equation W,.l is the earnings of the avwage worbr Mth s-l years of educ?tiow T is number ofye~s untd retirement, which we set to 40, r is the duect effect of education on productivity and we redefie K so that K=~+ y2 is the relationship betweens md components of productivity tie that the~cannot observe wheg new workers enter the~or market. The total dflerence in productivity associated with an e~a year of school is r + K+ T, where T is the slope of the relationship betweens and the productivi~component al q that is observable to the h when the individud enters the labor market. h our cdculatiom we assume that r + K is. 10, which is a bit above the estimate of the relationship between education and the log wage in our sample. (See Table 2 , column 1) TMs estimate will overstate r + K by T. The parameter Vt is the coefficient relating the firm's expectation of tie @ven the informations@ Dt to tie, with $1= Cov@(v+elDt),v+e)Nar(v+e)
If the h is fi~y informed by period t, $i is 1.
We wish to solve for p given empirical information about the rate at wtich information about skills is reflected in wages. The models underling Tables 5~d 6.~low us to~mPu!e the time profile of the eff-of~QT out"to about 15 yews. &smne, perhaps heroidly given that MQT is positively related to receipt of company trti~that none of the ticrase in the effect of QT reflects training. 16~sme fires lem about~~mponents of the productivity of the worker at the same rate. This assumption ties out the possibfity that the firm rni~t learn about 16 we befieve fiat MQT is positively related to receipt Ofgened.~-g~d % 'pecfic. training, but it it worth poindng out that if the~SYv@g measure captures training that is ticed by the firm @erhaps because it is hi~y firm specfic), then the association betweeri *g and"~QT dt nOt~X ow~fiis.
HOwever, tie .~K!ductiOn.~f match sp%ific~Pi~_~t~tie~wis (ei~?r through heterogenei~in match qtity or firm specific titig)
complicates our simple competitive model of wage determination because it 1-to a gap in *"e vsdue of the worker to the current employer and outside employers. The effect this wodd have on ow amdysis is unclear.
competence on the job more rapidy t~rur it learns about absenteeism and the propensity to quit.
Specticdly, we need to assume that 6t = $,, or, using the defitions ofthese p~etC ov (E(tielDJ,v) When we use vakres of $, based on the IV estimates using actual experience as the experience measure (Table 6 , column 5), we obtairr even lower estimates of the intemd rate of return that could be due to sigrrdhng.
In the right panel we consider a human capittisimg model by setting r to .05. The results for the mixed model show that if the "human capit~component of the return to education is .05 then the totrd return is about. 08 if the weight on v+e is. 5 when experience is 15 and fis never learn anything else. The sigrudfing component of the return is ody. 03, which is ody 600/0 of what one obtains by subtracting .05 from the total education~erentid (r + K) of. 1
We conclude from this that even a relatively slow rate of learning wodd e~ate much of the economic return to using education to si@ productivi~. We have emphasked that our use the time path of bz to itier the path of $t requires a strong assumption about the flow of information to fis which impfies that tiey are learn about d component of productivity at the same rate. If this is not the case, then the time profile of learning might be sensitive to our use of QT as the z variables. We rdso stress that our estimates of b~~@t.he~ected by Othw factors. This would affect our rate of return cdctiations.
In additio~there are two other important caveats that deserve discussion. FKs& it is hkely that the type of job an employee is in fiuences the type of information the employer receives. For example, employers probably do not Imuch about the managefid abtity, techrricd traifing, or cormnurrications SMIS from obsewations on the performance ofjanitors.
Education may itiuence the initial assignment, rmd infomtion flOWSmay be tited fiOm some jobs.~le our estimates of the pro~es of the~QT and s vtiables are not very sensitive to addkrg controls for 1 digit occu"patio~more analysis is needed. @esdts not reported.) Secon& to the efient that itiormation is private, workers may need to resort to education because it is a public signal of abfity. While the two caveats may hdt employer learnin~the empirical rmdts suggest that learning does take. place.
7. The Potential for Testing Services to Certify SW le education maybe too expensive to seine as a means for able workers to certifi themselves to employers, perhaps other mechanisms could perform this finctio~at I=st for some determinants of productivity Here we point out that interpreting our estimates of the time profile of the effect of MQT on wages w the result of employer learning isnpfies that tigb abihy workers would have a substantial finaneid incentive to take the~QT to differentiate themselves from those who are less able in this dimension.
Suppose that a third party were to administer the MQT and certify the resdts to outside employers, in much the same way that the Educatiod Testing Service administers the SAT exams. Using our estirnatw of the learning pro~e and the same range of assumptions about the fiaetion of information contained in~QT that is known to fis by the time experience is 15 that we used in Table 7 , we have computed how much a person who befieves that he is 1 standard deviation above the meao for the MQT would pay to take the test at the time he enters the wor~orce. 17 The OLS intimates using potential experience (Table 5 , COhunn 5) fiPIY that if firms become fifly informed about productivity by the time experience is 15 and the interest rate is .1, then the person would be wiUlng to pay .559 of the fist year's salary for the test.'8 The corresponding value when we use the IV estimates in Table 6 , cokunn 5 is .330.
These c~culations raise the issue of why such a testing service has not emerged if information is initially imperfect. One answer is that firms are not aware that the~QT captures characteristics that have a strong association tith produtiivity. It is ody rwentIy, with the availabihty of the~SY, that labor economists have become aware of this. Another is that it would be difficult for a testing firm to become estabhshed at a mtioti level. A third is that, given race differences in distribution of~QT scores, firms who make use of~QT information in 17~a worker &d not how tis abdi~, he cordd take a practice test Onfis o~. pms~ably> this wodd not rtise the toti cost of the test very much.
18 Here we me~s~g tit
Ody I worker takes the test md i~ofig tie fmt hat tie composition" of the pool of workers who choose to take the test ti equilibrium wotid tiuence return for a particular me of worker.
hiring for a specfic job would have the burden of establishing that they are relevant to productivity in that job or run the risk of violating discrimination laws. This would be true even if inditiduds provided firms with the test results. However, we do not fid these answers to be fi~y satisfacto~. 19~yses
based on v~&Ies such as the wage rates of tibtigs or father's education may be less vuhrerable to this objection. We report qutitatively stilar findings for these variables in M.
Conclusion
This paper presents some prehmin~evidence on the rate at which employers learn about productivity and uses that evidence to guide an exploration of the extent to which the return to education could be due to signfllng. Our basic idea is that if employers learn quic~y, then the signfllng component of the return to education must be sd. To get evidence on how quic~y employers learn, we work with a model that is based on the premise tbt firms use the tiormation they have available to them to form judgments or befiefs about the productivity of the workers and then revise these behefs as additiond information becomes available. Building upon some previous work particularly Farber and Oibbons (1994) , we show that as fis acquire more information about a worker, pay may become more dependent on productivity and less dependent on easfiy observable characteristics or credentids. Our result that the effect of~QT on the wage rises with mperience and the effect of education decfines is consistent with the model Taken at face value, our estimates iden~the rate at which employer knowledge of worker quality rises with experience up to a scale parameter. We use tiese estimates along with some strong auxifiary assumptions to provide a range of estimates of what the intemd rate of return to education would be if education has no duect effect o.n productivity. Our dcrdations suggest that the "sign&g component" of the return to eduation is probably ordy a small part of 19 Note~so hat~fie absence of~institution such as the Educarionrd Tes~g se~ice> a fi might provide tie test. Some firms perform their own testig.. However, if the resdts were avaitable to the employees or otier h how that a particrdar firm tests its employees, then the firm wodd not be able to capture tie ml return to tesdng. z the percentage diffmence in wages associated~th edutien. fiw wtile we fid etidenw fiat information is "impetiect anddo statistically disctite among wung workers on the basis of educatio% our estimates suggest that they learn quictiy enough TO"tit the.retum to a costiy sigrrrd such as education. This does not m-, of coorse, tkt none of the ram of drrcation is a return to signtilng.
We wish to stress that we are st~in a relatively early stage in our tiysis of employer learning and statistical discrimination on the basis of education and other characteristics, and so the estimates underlying our analysis of the signaling return to education are somewhat pr~lminary. bung the issues we are pursuing is the possl~lhty that dfierences among workers in training rather than statisticrd discrimination with Ieting explains our restits. We are dso extending the analysis to other variables that are in the~SY but wodd be hard for employers to observe, such as characteristics of the father, mother and sibtigs.
In prefiwork we have Note Ml equations control for a quadratic time trend, a cubic experienw profile, and urban residerree.The sample size is 26,651. Table 5 in the case of Tab!e 7 and column 5 in Table 6 in the case of TAle 8. $15 is set to the values in the column heading. When t is~eater ban 15, $(t) is $,5+ (*40-~15)(t-tl)/(40-tl), where 40 is the length of the career. The intemrd rate of return should be compared to the log(Yfl,.l) = .1. b) The intemd rate of return to a year of school is negative. 92-07.
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